NPIC REGULATORY ISSUANCES

10 - 18 SERIES

RESCINDED, OBSOLETE, ETC.



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NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER

NPIC INSTRUCTION NO. 10-1

SECURITY 13 June 1969

GUIDELINES FOR CONTROLLING VISITS TO NPIC

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- 1. In accordance with principles recently approved by the DDI for controlling visitors the following guidelines are hereby established for NPIC.
 - a. <u>Visits by personnel from USIB-member agencies, USIB</u> Committees and NRO.

Required: Normal security procedures.

b. <u>Visits by working-level personnel from contractors and maintenance personnel.</u>

Required: Normal security procedures.

c. <u>Visits by U.S. personnel not included in (a) and (b)</u> above.

Required: DDI or Director, DIA approval in advance, for visit and proposed subject matter. To the extent feasible, requests for visits to NPIC will be channeled through the DDI or the Director, DIA so that NPIC may be advised in advance of necessary guidelines. In cases where requests for visits are levied directly on NPIC, the Director, NPIC will advise the DDI or the Director, DIA as appropriate. In the course of consideration of proposed visits, it will be determined whether participation by finished-intelligence production components may be desirable, depending on the nature and extent of topics to be discussed.

d. Visits by foreign officials.

Required: DDI or Director, DIA approval in advance for visit and proposed subject matter. The exception to this is that working level officers of imagery interpretation elements of foreign governments with whom NPIC is authorized to exchange imagery analysis information will be controlled by normal security and foreign liaison control procedures.

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2. In all briefings and discussions, personnel will continue to exercise discretion in expressing their views, making it clear that their findings, based on imagery analysis, have not been coordinated with other components of CIA or DIA and should not be construed to be all-source finished intelligence. Any significant development resulting from visits in the categories above will be reported promptly by memorandum to the DDI or the Director, DIA for appropriate action.

ARTHUR C. LUNDAHL
Director

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